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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 04/01/2008 Accident number: 460 
Accident time: 08:21 Accident Date: 16/09/2004 
Where it occurred: MF ID 11290, 
Odmutsko Polje 1 - 
Grebnice,  
Domaljevac-Samac 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 05/10/2004 
ID original source: None Name of source: BHMAC WL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PROM-1 AP Bfrag Ground condition: leaf litter 
metal scrap 
wet 
woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 04/01/2008 Date  last modified: 04/01/2008 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: y=6 542 141 x=4 988 
597 
Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate area marking (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
squatting to excavate (?) 
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Accident report 
This report was made available in 2006 and translated in 2007 specifically for entry to the 
DDAS. The content of the reports that were made available has been edited for anonymity 
and is summarised below. 
[Work was being conducted by a partnership between two national commercial demining 
groups.] 
An accident report was written by an investigative committee of BHMAC and signed by [Name 
removed] (presiding the committee), [Name removed] and [Name removed]. Another 
document from BHMAC was available: “Lessons Learned from the Demining Accident 16 
September 2004”, dated 5 October 2004 (the same date as the accident report), signed by 
the BHMAC director, [Name removed]. This second document contains no new information 
and repeats the recommendations of the investigative committee.   
 
Conditions at the site 
The minefield is in the village Grebnice, stretching along the road Orašje-Šamac. 50 metres 
south from the minefield there is a primary school. The minefield and the place of accident is 
swampy with soft soil, thick grass, bush and some trees. The area is flat and heavily 
contaminated with litter and metal peaces. The accident occurred during the assignment 
labelled ID 11290. The geographical coordinates of two victims were:  
y = 6 542 141, x = 4 988 597 for the fatally injured deminer,  
y = 6 542 198, x = 4 988 607 for the injured deminer. 
The weather at the time of the accident was cloudy and it had just started to rain. Due to rain 
the work has been stopped. The accident happened immediately after the work had been 
stopped.  
 
[Accident site (crater in centre).] 
The area around the accident has been disturbed after the accident and some pegs and 
tapes were obviously placed after the accident. 
 
The purpose of the demining task 
The main reason was to allow safe school attendance. Other reasons: the supervision of the 
state border (50 metres from Sava river, the border to Croatia), safe usage of the nearby road 
Orašje-Šamac, enabling the rebuilding of the infrastructure, agricultural use of the land and 
general safety.  
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 The work-site layout and marking  
The work-site had not been established according to the National Standards of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the SOPs. The administrative areas were established on the safe distance, 
but the area was not properly marked.  
 
[Vegetation at the site.] 
Supervision and discipline on the work-site  
The highest level of supervision was done by the work-site leader [Name removed], working 
for UG ZOM. The internal quality control (IQC) was done by [Name removed], who visited the 
work-site 26 July, 30 July, 1 August, 2 August, 5 August and 12 September 2004. In his 
reports, he failed to make a note about obvious important errors regarding SOPs. 
The team leader [Name removed], working for [Partner commercial demining group], was 
responsible for the deminers where the accident happened. His did not supervise well; he had 
noticed that the deminers work without PPE, but he did nothing.  
The company management never visited the work-site, although that was necessary, 
concerning the organisation and discipline at the work-site. There is an impression that the 
relations between [partner demining groups] are not in order; we were informed about some 
earlier problems.  
 
Quality assurance 
Until the day of the accident, [the site] has evidenced the following irregularities: two deminers 
working without helmets, no clearance overlap between the lanes, increased productivity, 
work 70 cm ahead of the base line, detectors Ebinger 2634 and 2644 have sensitivity lower 
than allowed. [The demining group] also gave some warnings and recommendations: the 
team leader was warned on the movements of the local population nearby; too much metal 
contamination, 100 m2 were returned for clearance; metal detector MD-8 gives continuously a 
signal, 45 m2 returned for clearance; recommended to increase the mutual distance 50 m due 
to possible PROM-1.  
The investigative committee has established that the documentation from the work-site is not 
adequate, not according to the Standard of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The monitoring from the 
monitoring organisations had not been performed.  
 
Medical support, injuries  
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The medical support was according to the Standard of Bosnia and Herzegovina (equipment, 
vehicle and personnel). The paramedic was on the place of the accident in 2 or 3 minutes. 
First he approached deminer [Victim No.1] in lane 4 and established heavy injuries. Than the 
paramedic went to lane 5 to [Victim No.2], while a deminer who used to be a paramedic of 
APM stayed with [Victim No.1]. [Victim No.2] was conscious; his left upper leg was heavily 
bleeding. After receiving first aid, he was transported to the hospital in Orašje (14.6 km away). 
He survived. [Victim No.1] had injuries of upper legs, head and other body parts. After being 
brought into the vehicle he did not show any signs of life. The official cause of death: 
explosive wounds on the whole body.  
The two deminers were insured according to the law and the Standard for Clearance of 
Landmines and UXO of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 200.000 BAM for death, 250.000 for heavy 
injuries. However, only 10 of 23 persons present at the work-site have been insured, 
according to the documentation. Either the documentation was not complete, or the 
organisation manipulates the insurance.  
 
PPE and tools 
The two deminers participating in the accident were not wearing their PPE. (It is not clear 
from the available documents if any PPE was issued to the deminers.) The team leader 
claimed that the reason was that he had already given the order to stop the work. PPE could 
have prevented most of the injuries of [Victim No.2]. The metal detector of [Victim No.1] was 
checked and it was functioning properly. However, it has been established that some metal 
detectors were not used at the required sensitivity. 
[The detector shown in a site photograph was the Ebinger EBEX 420 PB.] 
Demining company [Name removed] had another demining accident 5 August 2004, when the 
injured deminer did not wear his helmet. [DDAS457] 
 
The mine 
The PROM-1 was placed to be activated by a direct contact with the foot, with the star above 
the ground surface. A tripwire was not found.  
 
Activities of the deminer immediately before the accident  
In a non-marked lane, deminer [Victim No.1] tried to identify the source of a metal-detector 
signal by using a prodder and an excavation tool. He possibly used the prodder and the 
excavation tool simultaneously to achieve higher productivity. The star of the PROM-1 was 
above the ground surface. Therefore it is not likely that the mine was activated with a prodder. 
It is most likely that it was activated with inappropriate excavation tool. The examination of the 
area cleared in the days before the accident leads to the conclusion that vertical excavation 
had been performed, which is characteristic for non-demining tools and against the Standard 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the SOP of the company.  
 
Recommendations of the investigative committee 
It is recommended to temporarily withdraw the accreditation for demining from the demining 
organisation [Demining group]; to temporarily withdraw (on 6 months) the personal 
accreditation for demining from the team leader [Name removed] from [Second Demining 
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group in partnership]; to mark and clear the area demined between 10 and 16 September 
2004 with a stronger control of BHMAC; and to distribute the conclusions and the 
recommendations of this investigation to demining organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Conclusion 
The deminer worked in a non-marked lane without wearing any PPE. The accident was 
caused by inappropriate excavation of PROM-1, probably with inappropriate tools. As a 
consequence, the deminer activating the mine died and another deminer at 59 metres 
distance suffered severe injuries.  
The demining company had violated procedures defined in the Standard for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and their own SOPs. The documentation was inadequate and incomplete, the 
marking was inadequate, metal-detectors were used on lower sensitivities or they were 
malfunctioning, inadequate excavation (vertical excavation and inadequate tool) was 
performed, PPE was not used, the recommendation of the investigations of earlier accidents 
were not followed, some detectors were used with a sensitivity lower than the requirement of 
the Standard.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 610 Name: [Name removed]  
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT: After being brought into the ambulance he did not show any signs of life. The 
official cause of death: explosive wounds on the whole body. No Medical report was made 
available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 611 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket Protection used: None 
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Short visor 
Helmet 
 
Summary of injuries: 
severe Leg 
COMMENT: See Medical report. 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available. 
After the accident Victim No.2 was conscious and his left upper leg was heavily bleeding. 
After receiving first aid, he was transported to the hospital in Orašje (14.6 km away). He 
survived. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because 
the investigators recommended the removal of accreditation from the organisation because of 
the many breaches of SOP at the task, including an apparent failure to insure deminers 
adequately. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the field 
controllers lacked the authority (or the knowledge) to impose the safety requirements in the 
SOPs. 
The second victim suffered a severe leg wound at 59 metres, which is the farthest secondary 
injury from a PROM-1 in HD on record, and may require a revision of safe working distances 
in areas where active PROM-1s can be anticipated. That said, the victim’s PPE would not 
have covered his legs anyway. The 360 degree spread of fragments over this distance makes 
it very unlikely that he was hit by more than one fragment. 
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